Natural duality, modality, and coalgebra  by Maruyama, Yoshihiro
Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra 216 (2012) 565–580
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jpaa
Natural duality, modality, and coalgebra
Yoshihiro Maruyama
Oxford University Computing Laboratory, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 27 July 2010
Received in revised form 12 June 2011
Available online 9 November 2011
Communicated by J. Adámek
MSC: 08C20; 06D50; 18B99
a b s t r a c t
The theory of natural dualities is a general theory of Stone–Priestley-type categorical
dualities based on the machinery of universal algebra. Such dualities play a fundamental
role in recent developments of coalgebraic logic. At the same time, however, natural
duality theory has not subsumed important dualities in coalgebraic logic, including the
Jónsson–Tarski topological duality and the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema coalgebraic
duality for the class of all modal algebras. By introducing a new notion of ISPM, in
this paper, we aim to extend the theory of natural dualities so that it encompasses the
Jónsson–Tarski duality and the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality. The main results
are topological and coalgebraic dualities for ISPM(L)where L is a semi-primal algebra with
a bounded lattice reduct. These dualities are shown building upon the Keimel–Werner
semi-primal duality theorem. Our general theory subsumes both the Jónsson–Tarski and
Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venemadualities.Moreover, it provides new coalgebraic dualities
for algebras of many-valued modal logics and certain insights into a category-equivalence
problem for categories of algebras involved. It also follows from our dualities that the
corresponding categories of coalgebras have final coalgebras and cofree coalgebras. ISPM
provides a natural framework for the universal algebra of modalities, and as such, for the
theory of modal natural dualities.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
By proposing a new notion of ISPM as the modalization of ISP, in this paper, we attempt to extend the theory of natural
dualities (see [10,37]) so that it encompasses the Jónsson–Tarski topological duality (see [24,5,17,19]) and the Abramsky–
Kupke–Kurz–Venema coalgebraic duality (see [2,26]) for the class of all modal algebras. Such dualities play a fundamental
role in recent developments of coalgebraic logic (see [9]), which allows us to unify different kinds of modal logics, based on
the theory of coalgebras.
A typical story in coalgebraic logic is as follows (see [27]). A dual adjunction induced by a schizophrenic object (see [39])
represents the syntax and semantics of a propositional logic (some researchers call such an adjunction a logical connection;
see [28]). The Stone adjunction between Boolean algebras and sets is a typical example of this. We then fix an endofunctor
on one category in the dual adjunction, which in turn induces an endofunctor on the other. The algebras and coalgebras
of the endofunctors give rise to the syntax and semantics of the propositional logic equipped with modality. In particular,
the standard modal logic K and Kripke semantics arise from the Stone adjunction by taking the power-set functor as an
endofunctor on sets. Many modal logics such as monotone modal logic and probabilistic modal logic fall into this picture. In
‘‘good’’ cases, we can finally obtain duality between the corresponding algebras and coalgebras, as we are able to lead from
the Stone duality to the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality via the Jónsson–Tarski duality.
In relation to this picture of coalgebraic logic, we start with the Keimel–Werner semi-primal duality theorem
(see [10, Theorem 3.3.14] and [25]) in natural duality theory. The Keimel–Werner theorem is a universal-algebraic
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generalization of the Stone duality for Boolean algebras and can be seen as dual adjunctions induced by schizophrenic
objects, representing the syntax and semantics of propositional logics. Our aim is then to establish the corresponding
Jónsson–Tarski-type duality and the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema-type duality by introducing the new notion of ISPM.
At least under the assumption of semi-primality, categories arising from ISPM can be considered as categories of algebras
for certain ‘‘free-generation’’ endofunctors on categories obtained via ISP, and the duals of categories induced by ISPM can
be described as categories of coalgebras for certain ‘‘Vietoris-style’’ endofunctors on the duals of categories corresponding
to ISP.
In the following, let us first review an aspect of natural duality theory and a certain difficulty in incorporating into it the
Jónsson–Tarski duality and the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality for the class of all modal algebras. We shall then
see that the difficulty can be overcome with the help of ISPM.
The theory of natural dualities by Davey et al. is a powerful general theory of the Stone–Priestley-type dualities based
on the machinery of universal algebra. It basically considers duality theory for ISP(M) where M is a finite algebra. It is
useful for obtaining new dualities and actually encompasses many known dualities, including the Stone duality for Boolean
algebras (see [42]), Priestley duality for distributive lattices (see [40]), and Cignoli duality for MVn-algebras, i.e., algebras of
Łukasiewicz n-valued logic (see [8,35]), to name but a few (for more instances, see [10,37]).
At the same time, however, it has not encompassed the Jónsson–Tarski duality or the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema
duality for the class of all modal algebras, any of which is important in coalgebraic logic. We consider that this is mainly
because the class of all modal algebras cannot be expressed as ISP(M) for a finite algebraM , in contrast to the fact that any
of the class of Boolean algebras, the class of distributive lattices, and the class of MVn-algebras can be expressed as ISP(M)
for a suitable finite algebraM .
We should note here that, given a modal algebra, the Boolean operations of the function algebra on its spectrum (i.e., the
space of prime filters) can be defined pointwise, while only the modal operation of the function algebra cannot be defined
pointwise (recall that it is defined depending on the canonical relation induced by themodal operation of the original modal
algebra). In a nutshell, modality is not a pointwise operation unlike the other Boolean operations. For the very reason, the
class of all modal algebras cannot be expressed as ISP(M) (all the operations of A ∈ ISP(M) are pointwise by definition), and
we have to pay a special attention to modality when developing natural duality theory for algebras with modal operations.
We remark that the same thing can be said also for the implication operation of a Heyting algebra, which is not pointwise
(on the spectrum of the Heyting algebra). And this actually tells us a duality-theoretic reason why Gödel failed to capture
intuitionistic logic as a many-valued logic (broadly speaking, ISP(M) amounts to algebras ofM-valued logic).
In this paper, we introduce a new notion of ISPM in order to extend the theory of natural dualities so that it encompasses
the Jónsson–Tarski topological duality and theAbramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema coalgebraic duality. It is crucial here that the
class of all modal algebras coincides with ISPM(2) for the two-element Boolean algebra 2. Moreover, we have the following
facts: for n defined in Definition 2.9 below, ISPM(n) coincides with the class of all algebras of Łukasiewicz n-valued modal
logic (for this logic, see, e.g., [6,20,44]); a similar thing holds also for algebras of a version of Fitting’s many-valued modal
logic (for this logic, see, e.g., [15,16,29,32]). Thus, the notion of ISPM seems to be natural and useful for our goal.
Our main results (Theorems 3.24 and 4.11) are topological and coalgebraic dualities for ISPM(L)where L is a semi-primal
algebrawith a bounded lattice reduct. Our results encompass both the Jónsson–Tarski and Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema
dualities as the case L = 2. They also encompass topological dualities in [44,32] for algebras of many-valued modal logics.
Our dualities are developed based on the Keimel–Werner semi-primal duality theorem in the theory of natural dualities, and
may be considered as modalized extensions of the semi-primal duality theorem on algebras with bounded lattice reducts.
As applications, we obtain new coalgebraic dualities for algebras of Łukasiewicz n-valued modal logic and for algebras of a
version of Fitting’s many-valued modal logic. With the help of the duality results, we can also show the existence of final
coalgebras and cofree coalgebras in the categories of coalgebras involved. Note that final coalgebras are significantly used
for the semantics of programming languages (see [45]). We finally provide a duality-based criterion for the equivalence of
categories of algebras concerned.
Several authors have developed duality theories for those classes of modal algebras (in the wider sense) that can be
expressed as ISP(M) for finite algebrasM . (see, e.g., [41,43]). However, they do not encompass the Jónsson–Tarski duality or
the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality for the class of all modal algebras, since the class of all modal algebras cannot
be expressed as ISP(M) for a finite algebraM . By modalizing the notion of ISP, this paper makes it possible to incorporate
both the Jónsson–Tarski and Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema dualities into the theory of natural dualities.
As a (rough) historical note, we remark that the duality of modal algebras and coalgebras for the Vietoris functor (or
Stone coalgebras) was essentially discovered by Abramsky, and his relevant talk was given at the 1988 British Colloquium
on Theoretical Computer Science as mentioned in [2]. The paper version [2] of the 1988 talk, however, had remained
unpublished until 2005. On the other hand, in 2003, Kupke, Kurz, andVenemapublished their paper [26] providing a detailed
description of the duality. Their work was done independently of Abramsky’s. Taking all this into consideration, we call the
duality ‘‘Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality’’ in this paper. It could also be called just ‘‘Abramsky duality’’ (especially
if a shorter term is preferred). At the same time, we emphasize that Esakia first mentioned the use of Vietoris spaces in the
context of non-classical logics in his paper [14], as early as in 1974.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notions of ISPM and Kripke condition. The Kripke
conditionmay be considered as completeness in logical terms and plays an important role in our duality theory. In Section 3,
we show the first result, i.e., a topological duality for ISPM(L). In Section 4, we show the second result, i.e., a coalgebraic
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duality for ISPM(L), which implies coalgebraic dualities for algebras of Łukasiewicz n-valued modal logic and for algebras of
a version of Fitting’s many-valued modal logic. As an application of our dualities, we obtain a result on the equivalence of
categories of algebras involved. It also follows from our dualities that the corresponding categories of coalgebras have cofree
coalgebras and final coalgebras. In Section 5, we conclude the paper by discussing several future directions of research,
including a coalgebraic extension of the notion of ISPM, and by comparing natural duality theory with categorical duality
theory. Furthermore, we briefly discuss broader philosophical backgrounds behind the idea of the Stone duality in a wider
sense, at the end of the paper.
2. The notion of ISPM
For universal algebra and lattice theory, we refer the reader to [7,11]. For category theory, we refer to [4], which contains
categorical universal algebra and categorical universal topology (especially, categorical Birkhoff theorems and its topological
analogues).
Throughout this paper, let L denote a finite algebra with a bounded lattice reduct (it is natural from a logical point of view
to suppose the existence of a bounded lattice reduct, since most logics are equipped with the lattice connectives ∧ and ∨
and the truth constants 0 and 1). Let 2 denote the two-element Boolean algebra.
From a logical point of view, we may see L as an algebra of truth values. Since the lattice reduct of L turns out to be a
complete Heyting algebra (note that any finite distributive lattice is a Heyting algebra), the lattice reduct of L is actually a
so-called truth-value objectΩ in an elementary topos. The case that L = 2 amounts to classical logic, and ISP(2) coincides
with the class of all Boolean algebras.
We define the notion of modal power as follows. For a set S, LS denotes the set of all functions from S to L. A Kripke frame
is defined as a tuple (S, R) such that S is a non-empty set and R is a binary relation on S.
Definition 2.1. For a Kripke frame (S, R), the modal power of L with respect to (S, R) is defined as LS ∈ ISP(L) equipped
with a unary operation R on LS defined by
(Rf )(w) =

{f (w′) ; wRw′}
where f ∈ LS andw ∈ S. Then, a modal power of L is defined as the modal power of Lwith respect to (S, R) for some Kripke
frame (S, R). (To be precise about the order of quantifiers, this means that, for any modal power A of L, there is some Kripke
frame (S, R) such that A is a modal power of Lwith respect to (S, R).)
For a Kripke frame (S, R), let L(S,R) denote the modal power of Lwith respect to (S, R).
The notion of ISPM is then defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. ISPM(L) denotes the class of all isomorphic copies of subalgebras of modal powers of L.
We often denote by (A,) an element of ISPM(L). Note that (x ∧ y) = x ∧ y for (A,) ∈ ISPM(L) and x, y ∈ A.
Definition 2.3. ISP(L) denotes the category of algebras in ISP(L) and homomorphisms where a homomorphism is defined
as a function which preserves all the operations of L.
ISPM(L) denotes the category of algebras in ISPM(L) and modal homomorphisms where a modal homomorphism is
defined as a function which preserves  and all the operations of L.
The modalization of ISP preserves the closedness under I, S, and P as follows.
Proposition 2.4. ISPM(L) is closed under I, S, and P.
Proof. It is clear that ISPM(L) is closed under I and S. In order to show that it is closed under direct products, let I be a set and
(Ai,i) ∈ ISPM(L) for i ∈ I . Then it follows that for each i ∈ I there is a Kripke frame (Si, Ri) such that (Ai,i) is embedded
into L(Si,Ri), i.e., the modal power of Lwith respect to (Si, Ri). Define a Kripke frame (S, R) by
S =

i∈I
Si and R =

i∈I
Ri.
We claim that
∏
i∈I(Ai,i) can be embedded into L(S,R). To show this, we define a function
e :
∏
i∈I
(Ai,i)→ L(S,R)
as follows. Given x ∈ S and fi : Ai → L for i ∈ I , define (e((fi)i∈I))(x) = fk(x)where k is the unique j ∈ I such that x ∈ Sj. Let
 denote the modal operation of
∏
i∈I(Ai,i). Note that  is defined pointwise. We show that e((fi)i∈I) = Re((fi)i∈I). Let
x ∈ S. It follows from the definition of (S, R) that if x ∈ Sk for k ∈ I then
(Re((fi)i∈I))(x) =

{e((fi)i∈I)(y) ; xRky} = (kfk)(x).
It also holds that if x ∈ Sk then
e((fi)i∈I)(x) = e((ifi)i∈I)(x) = (kfk)(x).
Thus, we have shown that e preserves. It is straightforward to see that e also preserves the other operations of
∏
i∈I(Ai,i).
Hence, ISPM(L) is closed under direct products. 
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According to the theory of free algebras in universal algebra, the above proposition gives us the following.
Corollary 2.5. ISPM(L) has free algebras.
Given (A,) ∈ ISPM(L), we define the corresponding canonical relation R on HomISP(L)(A, L).
Definition 2.6. For (A,) ∈ ISPM(L), we define a binary relation R onHomISP(L)(A, L) as follows: For v, u ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L),
vRu iff the following holds:
∀a ∈ L ∀x ∈ A (v(x) ≥ a implies u(x) ≥ a).
Definition 2.7. ISPM(L) (or L) satisfies the Kripke condition iff, for any (A,) ∈ ISPM(L), any v ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L), and any
x ∈ A, the following holds:
v(x) =

{u(x) ; vRu}.
The Kripke condition may be considered as completeness in logical terms.
In this paper, the Kripke condition can be seen as a condition on L rather than ISPM(L), since we concentrate on ‘‘normal’’
modal logic induced by L. If we also consider other types of modal logics, however, it seems that ISPM is not a unique way
to generate the corresponding classes of modal algebras (in the wider sense). In that case, the Kripke condition depends on
the way of generating modal algebras as well as the basic structure L.
The notions of ISPM and Kripke condition are motivated by Propositions 2.8 and 2.10 below.
Proposition 2.8. ISPM(2) coincides with the class of all modal algebras and satisfies the Kripke condition.
Proof. By the Jónsson–Tarski representation (see, e.g., [5, Theorem 5.43]), anymodal algebra can be embedded into amodal
power of 2. It is straightforward to see that any A ∈ ISPM(2) is a modal algebra. Thus, ISPM(2) coincides with the class of
all modal algebras. It follows from Proposition 3.14 below that ISPM(2) satisfies the Kripke condition (a direct proof of this
fact can also be given in a similar way to the completeness proof of classical modal logic K). 
The algebra n of truth values in Łukasiewicz n-valued logic is defined as follows (see, e.g., [18]):
Definition 2.9. Let n denote {0, 1/(n−1), . . . , (n−2)/(n−1), 1} equippedwith the operations (∧,∨, ∗, ℘,→, (-)⊥, 0, 1)
defined by
x ∧ y = min(x, y);
x ∨ y = max(x, y);
x ∗ y = max(0, x+ y− 1);
x ℘ y = min(1, x+ y);
x→ y = min(1, 1− (x− y));
x⊥ = 1− x.
AnMMVn-algebra introduced in [44, Definition 3.1] is an algebra of Łukasiewicz n-valued modal logic. We then have
the following.
Proposition 2.10. ISPM(n) coincides with the class of allMMVn-algebras and satisfies the Kripke condition.
Proof. By Teheux representation following from [44, Theorem 4.11], anyMMVn-algebra can be embedded into a modal
power of n. It is straightforward to see that any A ∈ ISPM(n) is anMMVn-algebra. Thus, ISPM(2) coincides with the class
of all modal algebras. It follows from Proposition 3.14 below that ISPM(n) satisfies the Kripke condition (or this also follows
from the completeness of Łukasiewicz n-valued modal logic). 
A similar proposition can be shown also for L-ML-algebras, which are algebras of a version of Fitting’smany-valuedmodal
logic (see [29,32]).
Thus, the notion of ISPM seems to be natural and useful.
3. Modal semi-primal duality theorem
In the remaining part of the paper, we assume that L is semi-primal. A semi-primal algebra is a useful concept in universal
algebra and is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let A be an algebra (in the sense of universal algebra) and n a positive integer. A function f : An → A is
called conservative iff, for any a1, . . . , an ∈ A, f (a1, . . . , an) is in the subalgebra of A generated by {a1, . . . , an}.
A semi-primal algebra is a finite algebra A such that, for any positive integer n, every conservative function f : An → A is
a term function of A. (Note that a term function is called a polynomial in some literature.)
Intuitively, we may say that a conservative function on an algebra is a function preserving the subalgebra structure of
the algebra. For characterizations of semi-primality and term-definable operations on semi-primal algebras, we refer the
reader to [38,12].
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We remark that, under the assumption of the semi-primality of L, ISPM(L) actually forms a variety (or amonadic category
in categorical terms), which shall be shown in a subsequent paper on the finite axiomatizability of ISP(L) and ISPM(L).
Now it is straightforward to verify the following lemmas by checking that each function is conservative.
Lemma 3.2. Define a function q : L4 → L by
q(x, y, z, w) =

w if x ≠ y
z if x = y
where x, y, z, w ∈ L. Then, q : L4 → L is a term function of L.
The function q : L4 → L is called the quaternary discriminator.
Lemma 3.3. Let a ∈ L. Define a function Ta : L→ L by
Ta(x) =

1 if x = a
0 if x ≠ a
where x ∈ L. Then, Ta is a term function of L.
To verify the proposition above, note that any subalgebra of L contains constants 0 and 1 by the definition of a subalgebra.
From a logical point of view, Ta(p) intuitively means that the truth value of a proposition p is exactly a for an element a of
the algebra L of truth values, which may be seen as a truth-value object in a topos, since the lattice reduct of L is a complete
Heyting algebra.
Lemma 3.4. Let a ∈ L. Define a function Ua : L→ L by
Ua(x) =

1 if x ≥ a
0 if x  a
where x ∈ L. Then, Ua is a term function of L.
We can also define the function Ua : L→ L by using Ta in the following way:
Ua(x) =

{Tb(x) ; a ≤ b and b ∈ L}.
It is straightforward to see that Ua and ∧ are commutative, i.e.,
Ua(x ∧ y) = Ua(x) ∧ Ua(y).
Moreover,  and Ua are commutative, i.e.,
Ua(x) = Ua(x)
for any x ∈ A where (A,) ∈ ISPM(L). This can be verified using the fact that Ua and ∧ are commutative (note that  is
defined via ∧). We also remark that U1(x) = T1(x).
Lemma 3.5. Let a ∈ L. Define a function (-)→ (-) : L2 → L by
x→ y =

1 if x ≤ y
y if x  y
where x, y ∈ L. Then,→ is a term function of L.
The function (-)→ (-) : L2 → L can also be defined by x→ y = q(x ∧ y, x, 1, y).
We can apply the Keimel–Werner semi-primal duality theorem [10, Theorem 3.3.14] to obtain a topological duality for
ISP(L), which is explained in the following subsection. We shall later build a duality theory for ISPM(L) based on the semi-
primal duality theorem.
3.1. Semi-primal duality for ISP(L)
Let SubAlg(L) denote the set of all subalgebras of L. For a Boolean space S, let SubSp(S) denote the set of all closed
subspaces of S, where a Boolean space means a zero-dimensional compact Hausdorff space.
Definition 3.6. We define a category BSL. An object in BSL is a tuple (S, α) such that S is a Boolean space and that a function
α : SubAlg(L)→ SubSp(S) satisfies:
1. S = α(L);
2. if L3 = L1 ∩ L2 for L1, L2, L3 ∈ SubAlg(L), then α(L3) = α(L1) ∩ α(L2).
An arrow f : (S, α)→ (S ′, β) in L-BS is a continuousmap f : S → S ′ that satisfies the condition that, for anyM ∈ SubAlg(L),
if x ∈ α(M) then f (x) ∈ β(M). We call a map satisfying the condition a subspace-preserving map.
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Having an object in BSL is equivalent to having a meet-preserving function α : SubAlg(L) → SubSp(S). This provides
another definition of an object in BSL as a SubAlg(L)-indexed family of Boolean spaces satisfying the condition of meet-
preservation.
Note also that the condition 2 above implies that, if L1 ⊂ L2 for L1, L2 ∈ SubAlg(L), then α(L1) ⊂ α(L2).
We equip L and its subalgebras with the discrete topologies. Define αL : SubAlg(L) → SubSp(L) by αL(M) = M for
M ∈ SubAlg(L). Then, (L, αL) is an object in BSL.
For A ∈ ISP(L), we equip HomISP(L)(A, L)with the topology generated by {⟨x⟩ ; x ∈ A}where
⟨x⟩ = {v ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L) ; v(x) = 1}
for x ∈ A. Note that for x ∈ A, ⟨x⟩ is clopen, since HomISP(L)(A, L) \ ⟨x⟩ = ⟨T1(x)→ 0⟩ by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5.
Definition 3.7. We define a contravariant functor Spec : ISP(L)→ BSL. For an object A in ISP(L), let
Spec(A) = (HomISP(L)(A, L), αA)
where αA is defined by
αA(M) = HomISP(L)(A,M)
forM ∈ SubAlg(L). For an arrow f : A→ B in ISP(L), Spec(f ) is defined by Spec(f )(v) = v ◦ f for v ∈ HomISP(L)(B, L).
The functor Spec can be defined also for ISPM(L) (by considering modality-free reducts). The domain of Spec is defined
to be ISP(L) just because it is an ingredient of duality between ISP(L) and BSL.
Definition 3.8. We define a contravariant functor Cont : BSL → ISP(L). For an object (S, α) in BSL, define Cont(S, α) as
HomBSL((S, α), (L, αL))
equippedwith the pointwise operations. For an arrow f : (S1, α1)→ (S2, α2) inBSL, Cont(f ) is defined by Cont(f )(g) = g◦f
for g ∈ Cont(S2, α2).
Later we shall extend Spec and Cont to the modal setting (RSpec and MCont respectively).
By the Keimel–Werner semi-primal duality theorem [10, Theorem 3.3.14], we obtain the following.
Theorem 3.9. ISP(L) and BSL are dually equivalent via Spec and Cont.
The semi-primal duality theorem is essentially due to [25].
Based on the above duality, we shall show that ISPM(L) is dually equivalent to RBSL, which is defined in Definition 3.15
below. In order to prove this duality, we first verify the Kripke condition for ISPM(L) in the next subsection.
3.2. The verification of the Kripke condition
In order to show that ISPM(L) satisfies the Kripke condition, we use the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras (see,
e.g., [23]). We first introduce the notion of the Boolean coreB(A) of A ∈ ISP(L).
Definition 3.10. For A ∈ ISP(L), define
B(A) = {x ∈ A ; T1(x) = x}.
Note that Ta(x),Ua(x) ∈ B(A) for any x ∈ A and a ∈ L.
Lemma 3.11. For A ∈ ISP(L), (B(A),∧,∨, T0, 0, 1) forms a Boolean algebra.
Proof. This follows from the two facts that (B(A),∧,∨, T0, 0, 1) is a subalgebra of a direct power of (B(L),∧,∨, T0, 0, 1)
and that (B(L),∧,∨, T0, 0, 1) is the two-element Boolean algebra (note that T0 is the complement operation). 
Lemma 3.12. For A ∈ ISP(L), let P be a prime filter of a Boolean algebraB(A). Define vP : A→ L by
vP(x) = a⇔ Ta(x) ∈ P.
Then, vP is an element of HomISP(L)(A, L).
Proof. Since

a∈L Ta(x) = 1 for x ∈ A and since Ta(x) ∧ Tb(x) = 0 for a, b ∈ L with a ≠ b, vP is well defined as a function
from A to L. Let t : An → A be an n-ary operation of A. Let xi ∈ A and ai = vP(xi) for i = 1, . . . , n. Then it follows by definition
that
Ta1(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ Tan(xn) ∈ P.
It is straightforward to show the following inequality (note that it is enough to verify the inequality in L):
Ta1(x1) ∧ · · · ∧ Tan(xn) ≤ Tt(a1,...,an)(t(x1, . . . , xn)).
Thus we have Tt(a1,...,an)(t(x1, . . . , xn)) ∈ P , which implies that
vP(t(x1, . . . , xn)) = t(a1, . . . , an) = t(vP(x1), . . . , vP(xn)).
This completes the proof. 
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The following lemma is crucial for the verification of the Kripke condition.
Lemma 3.13. Let (A,) ∈ ISPM(L), x ∈ A, a ∈ L, and v ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L). Then the following holds:
v(x) ≥ a iff for any u ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L), vRu implies u(x) ≥ a.
Proof. It is easily verified that the left-hand side implies the right-hand side. We show the converse by proving the
contrapositive. Assume that v(x)  a. This means that v(Ua(x)) ≠ 1. Let
X = {Ub(y) ; v(Ub(y)) = 1}.
Note that X ⊂ B(A). Let F be the filter ofB(A) generated by X .
We claim that Ua(x) /∈ F . Suppose for contradiction that Ua(x) ∈ F . Then there is ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ≤ Ua(x) and ϕ is
constructed from ∧ and elements of X . Since the equation Ub(y ∧ y′) = Ub(y) ∧ Ub(y′) holds in general, we may assume
that for some {Ub(xb) ; b ∈ L} ⊂ X ,
ϕ =

{Ub(xb) ; b ∈ L}.
By ϕ ≤ Ua(x), it follows from the definition of modal power that ϕ ≤ Ua(x). We also have
ϕ =

{Ub(xb) ; b ∈ L}.
Since Ub(xb) ∈ X , we have v(Ub(xb)) = 1 for any b ∈ L, whence it follows that v(ϕ) = 1. Thus, we have
v(Ua(x)) = v(Ua(x)) = 1,
which is a contradiction. Hence, we have Ua(x) /∈ F .
By the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras, there is a prime filter P ofB(A) such that F ⊂ P and Ua(x) /∈ P . Define
vP : A→ L as in Lemma 3.12 and then we have
vP ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L).
Since Ua(x) /∈ P and since T1(Ua(x)) = Ua(x), it follows that
vP(Ua(x)) ≠ 1, i.e., vP(x)  a.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that vRvP . By using X ⊂ P , this follows from the fact that vP(Ub(y)) = 1 for any
Ub(y) ∈ X (i.e., v(y) ≥ b implies vP(y) ≥ b). 
By the above lemma we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.14. ISPM(L) satisfies the Kripke condition, i.e., for any (A,) ∈ ISPM(L), any v ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L), and any x ∈ A,
the following holds:
v(x) =

{u(x) ; vRu}.
The above proposition plays an important role in establishing our duality result.
3.3. Category RBSL
For a Kripke frame (S, R) and X ⊂ S, define R−1[X] = {w ∈ S ; ∃w′ ∈ XwRw′}. Forw ∈ S, define R[w] = {w′ ∈ S ; wRw′}.
Definition 3.15. We define a category RBSL. An object in RBSL is a triple (S, α, R) such that (S, α) is an object in BSL and that
a binary relation R on S satisfies:
1. R[w] is closed in S for anyw ∈ S;
2. if X ⊂ S is clopen in S, then R−1[X] is clopen in S;
3. for anyM ∈ SubAlg(L), ifw ∈ α(M) then R[w] ⊂ α(M).
An arrow f : (S1, α1, R1)→ (S2, α2, R2) in RBSL is defined as an arrow f : (S1, α1)→ (S2, α2) in BSL which satisfies:
4. ifwR1w′ then f (w)R2f (w′);
5. if f (w1)R2w2 then there isw′ ∈ S1 such thatw1R1w′ and f (w′) = w2.
In order to show a dual equivalence between the categories ISPM(L) and RBSL, we introduce functors RSpec and MCont
in the next subsection.
3.4. Functors RSpec andMCont
Definition 3.16. We define a contravariant functor RSpec : ISPM(L)→ RBSL. For an object (A,) in ISPM(L), let
RSpec(A) = (HomISP(L)(A, L), αL, R)
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where R is defined in Definition 2.6. For an arrow f : A→ B in ISPM(L), define RSpec(f ) by
RSpec(f )(v) = v ◦ f
for v ∈ HomISP(L)(B, L).
The well-definedness of RSpec is shown by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.17. Let (A,) ∈ ISPM(L). Then, RSpec(A) is an object in RBSL.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, RSpec(A)without R is an object in BSL.
We first show that RSpec(A) satisfies item 1 in Definition 3.15. Let v ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L). Assume u /∈ R[v] for
u ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L). It suffices to show that there is an open subset O of HomISP(L)(A, L) such that
u ∈ O and R[v] ∩ O = ∅.
Since u /∈ R[v], there is x0 ∈ A such that ∃a ∈ L (v(x0) ≥ a and u(x0)  a). Then it follows from Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 that
u ∈ ⟨Ua(x0)→ 0⟩ and R[v] ∩ ⟨Ua(x0)→ 0⟩ = ∅.
We next show that RSpec(A) satisfies item 2 in Definition 3.15. Since R−1 preserves unions of sets and since {⟨x⟩ ; x ∈ A}
forms a base of the topology of HomISP(L)(A, L) (note that it is closed under finite intersections), it suffices to show that
R−1 (⟨x⟩) is clopen in S for any x ∈ A. We claim that
R−1 (⟨x⟩) = ⟨¬¬T1(x)⟩
where ¬ϕ is the abbreviation of ϕ → 0. Note that the right-hand side is clopen. To show the claim, we first assume
v ∈ ⟨¬¬T1(x)⟩. By Lemma 3.5, we have v(¬T1(x)) = 0. Then it follows from the Kripke condition that
0 = v(¬T1(x)) =

{u(¬T1(x)) ; vRu}.
Since u(¬T1(x)) is either 0 or 1 by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5, there is u ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L) with vRu such that u(¬T1(x)) = 0.
Then we have u ∈ ⟨x⟩. Therefore we conclude v ∈ R−1 (⟨x⟩). The converse is similarly proved by using the Kripke condition.
We finally show that RSpec(A) satisfies item 3 in Definition 3.15. Assume for contradiction that u ∈ HomISP(L)(A,M) and
R[u] \ HomISP(L)(A,M) ≠ ∅ for M ∈ SubAlg(L). Then there is v ∈ R[u] \ HomISP(L)(A,M), which means that uRv and
there is z0 ∈ A such that v(z0) /∈ M . Let a = v(z0). Then we have the following: for anyw ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L),
w(Ta(z0)→ z0) =

1 ifw(z0) ≠ a
a ifw(z0) = a.
Thus it follows from the Kripke condition and uRv that
u((Ta(z0)→ z0)) =

{w(Ta(z0)→ z0) ; uRw} = a.
This contradicts u ∈ HomISP(L)(A,M), since a /∈ M . Thus, RSpec(A) satisfies item 3. 
The following lemma is shown using the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras.
Lemma 3.18. For (A1,1), (A2,2) ∈ ISPM(L), let f be a modal homomorphism from (A1,1) to (A2,2). Then, RSpec(f ) is
an arrow in RBSL.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, RSpec(f ) is an arrow in BSL. Thus it remains to show that RSpec(f ) satisfies items 4 and 5 in
Definition 3.15. We first verify item 4. For v, u ∈ RSpec(A2), assume (v, u) ∈ R2 . Then it suffices to show that
(v ◦ f , u ◦ f ) ∈ R1 .
To show this, suppose that v ◦ f (1x) ≥ a for x ∈ A1 and a ∈ L. Then we have v(2f (x)) ≥ a. It follows from assumption
that u(f (x)) ≥ a. Thus we have (v ◦ f , u ◦ f ) ∈ R1 .
We next verify item 5. Assume that (RSpec(f )(v), u) ∈ R1 for v ∈ RSpec(A2) and u ∈ RSpec(A1). Define
Xv = {Ua(x) ; v(2Ua(x)) = 1};
Xu = {f (Ua(x)) ; u(Ua(x)) = 1}.
Let X = Xv ∪ Xu. We claim that X has the finite intersection property. Suppose for contradiction that X does not have the
finite intersection property. Then, since by Ua(x) = U1(Ua(x))we have
Xv = {U1(x) ; v(2U1(x)) = 1} and Xu = {f (U1(x)) ; u(U1(x)) = 1}
and since U1 distributes over ∧, there are U1(x), f (U1(y)) ∈ A2 such that v(2U1(x)) = 1, u(U1(y)) = 1, and U1(x) ≤
¬f (U1(y))where¬ϕ is the abbreviation of ϕ → 0. Then we have
2U1(x) ≤ 2¬f (U1(y)) = f (2¬U1(y)).
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It follows from v(2U1(x)) = 1 that
v(f (2¬U1(y))) = 1, i.e., (RSpec(f )(v))(2¬U1(y)) = 1.
By assumption, we have u(¬U1(y)) = 1, which contradicts u(U1(y)) = 1. Thus X has the finite intersection property. By
the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras, there is a prime filter P of B(A2) such that X ⊂ P . Define vP : A2 → L as in
Lemma 3.12 and then we have
vP ∈ HomISP(L)(A2, L).
It follows from Xv ⊂ P that vR2vP . It follows from Xu ⊂ P that RSpec(f )(vP) = u. This completes the proof. 
Thus we have shown that RSpec is well defined.
Definition 3.19. We define a contravariant functor MCont : RBSL → ISPM(L). For an object (S, α, R) in RBSL, define
MCont(S, α, R) = (Cont(S, α),R)
(for the definition of R, see Definition 2.1). For an arrow f : (S1, α1, R1)→ (S2, α2, R2) in RBSL, define MCont(f ) by
MCont(f )(g) = g ◦ f
for g ∈ Cont(S2, α2).
The well-definedness of MCont is shown by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.20. Let (S, α, R) be an object in RBSL. Then,MCont(S, α, R) is in ISPM(L).
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, MCont(S, α, R)without  is in ISP(L). We first verify that R is well defined on MCont(S, α, R), i.e.,
if f ∈ MCont(S, α, R) then Rf ∈ MCont(S, α, R). Let f ∈ MCont(S, α, R). We then have the following: For a ∈ L,
(Rf )−1(a) = R−1[(Ta(f ))−1(1)] ∩ (S \ R−1[(Ua(f ))−1(0)]),
where note that w ∈ R−1[(Ta(f ))−1(1)] means that there is w′ ∈ S such that wRw′ and f (w′) = a; and w ∈ S \ R−1
[(Ua(f ))−1(0)]means that there is now ∈ S such thatwRw′ and f (w′)  a. Since
R−1[(Ta(f ))−1(1)] ∩ (S \ R−1[(Ua(f ))−1(0)])
is clopen in S, Rf is a continuous map from S to L. It follows from the condition 3 in Definition 3.15 that Rf is subspace-
preserving. Thus we have Rf ∈ MCont(S, α, R), whence R is well defined. It follows from the definition of R that
MCont(S, α, R) is a subalgebra of a modal power LS of L, whence we have MCont(S, α, R) ∈ ISPM(L). 
Lemma 3.21. Let f : (S1, α1, R1)→ (S2, α2, R2) be an arrow in RBSL. Then,MCont(f ) is a modal homomorphism.
Proof. By Theorem 3.9, MCont(f ) is an arrow in ISP(L). It suffices to show that MCont(f )(g2) = (MCont(f )(g2)) for
g2 ∈ Cont(S2, α2). Letw1 ∈ S1. Then, we have
(MCont(f )(g2))(w1) = g2 ◦ f (w1) =

{g2(w2) ; f (w1)R2w2}.
Let a denote the rightmost side of the above equation. We also have
((MCont(f )(g2)))(w1) = ((g2 ◦ f ))(w1) =

{g2(f (w′)) ; w1R1w′}.
Let b denote the rightmost side of the above equation. Since f satisfies item 4 in Definition 3.15, we have a ≤ b. Since f
satisfies item 5 in Definition 3.15, we have a ≥ b. Hence we have a = b. 
Thus we have shown that MCont is well defined.
3.5. Topological duality for ISPM(L)
In this subsection, we show a topological duality for ISPM(L), thus generalizing the Jónsson–Tarski duality for modal
algebras from the viewpoint of universal algebra.
Theorem 3.22. Let A ∈ ISPM(L). Then, A is isomorphic toMCont ◦ RSpec(A) in the category ISPM(L).
Proof. Define εA : A→ MCont ◦ RSpec(A) by
εA(x)(v) = v(x)
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for x ∈ A and v ∈ HomISP(L)(A, L). It follows from Theorem 3.9 that εA is an isomorphism in ISP(L). Thus it remains to show
that εA preserves , i.e., εA(x) = RεA(x) for x ∈ A. For v ∈ RSpec(A), we have the following:
(RεA(x))(v) =

{εA(x)(u) ; vRu}
=

{u(x) ; vRu}
= v(x) (by the Kripke condition)
= εA(x)(v).
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.23. Let (S, α, R) be an object in RBSL. Then, (S, α, R) is isomorphic to RSpec ◦MCont(S, α, R) in the category RBSL.
Proof. Define η(S,α,R) : (S, α, R)→ RSpec ◦MCont(S, α, R) by
η(S,α,R)(x)(f ) = f (x)
for x ∈ S and f ∈ Cont(S, α). By Theorem 3.9, η(S,α,R) is an isomorphism in the category BSL. Below, we denote η(S,α,R) by
ηS . We first show that, for any w,w′ ∈ S, wRw′ iff ηS(w)RRηS(w′). Recall that the right-hand side holds iff the following
condition holds: ∀a ∈ L ∀f ∈ Cont(S, α) (ηS(w)(Rf ) ≥ a implies ηS(w′)(f ) ≥ a).
Assume thatwRw′. We verify the above condition. Let a ∈ L and f ∈ Cont(S, α). Assume ηS(w)(Rf ) ≥ a. Since
a ≤ ηS(w)(Rf ) = (Rf )(w) =

{f (z) ; wRz},
we have ηS(w′)(f ) = f (w′) ≥ a.
The converse is shown as follows. To prove the contrapositive, assume that (w,w′) /∈ R. It follows from Definition 3.15
that there is a clopen subset O of S such that w′ ∈ O and R[w] ∩ O = ∅. Define f : S → L by f (w) = 0 for w ∈ O and
f (w) = 1 forw /∈ O. Then we have f ∈ Cont(S, α), (Rf )(w) = 1, and f (w′) ≠ 1. Thus we have
ηS(w)(Rf ) ≥ 1 and ηS(w′)(f )  1,
whence the above condition does not hold.
It remains to show that ηS and η−1S satisfy item 5 in Definition 3.15. This follows immediately from the facts that wRw′
iff ηS(w)RRηS(w
′) and that ηS is bijective. 
Finally we obtain the modal semi-primal duality theorem.
Theorem 3.24. The categories ISPM(L) and RBSL are dually equivalent via the functors RSpec andMCont.
Proof. Let Id1 denote the identity functor on ISPM(L) and Id2 denote the identity functor on RBSL. It is sufficient to show
that there are natural isomorphisms ε : Id1 → MCont ◦ RSpec and η : Id2 → RSpec ◦MCont. For an L-ML-algebra A, define
εA as in the proof of Theorem 3.22. For an object (S, α, R) in RBSL, define η(S,α,R) as in the proof of Theorem 3.23. Then it is
straightforward to verify that η and ε are natural transformations. It follows from Theorems 3.22 and 3.23 that η and ε are
natural isomorphisms. 
The original Jónsson–Tarski duality can be recovered by letting L be the two-element Boolean algebra in the above
theorem.
We have extended the Keimel–Werner semi-primal duality without modality:
ISP(L) ≃ BSLop
to the duality with modality:
ISPM(L) ≃ RBSLop.
This was accomplished via the new notion of ISPM, without which it would be difficult to obtain such a modalized analogue
of the semi-primal duality theorem.
In the next section, we shall show how to describe the category RBSL in terms of the theory of coalgebras, thus obtaining
a coalgebraic description of the duality ISPM(L) ≃ RBSLop.
4. Coalgebraic duality theorem
Let us recall the definitions of coalgebra and its morphism (for the basics of coalgebras, we refer the reader to [3,22]).
Definition 4.1. Let C be a category and T an endofunctor on C. A T-coalgebra is defined as a tuple (C, δ) for an object C in C
and an arrow δ : C → T(C) in C. For T-coalgebras (C1, δ1) and (C2, δ2), a T-coalgebra morphism from (C1, δ1) to (C2, δ2) is
defined as an arrow f : C1 → C2 in C that satisfies δ2 ◦ f = T(f ) ◦ δ1. Then, Coalg(T) denotes the category of T-coalgebras
and T-coalgebra morphisms.
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Let us recall the definition of Vietoris topology.
Definition 4.2. Let S be a topological space, OS the set of all open subsets of S, and CS the set of all closed subsets of S. For
a subset U of S, define
BS(U) = {F ∈ CS ; F ⊂ U} and DS(U) = {F ∈ CS ; F ∩ U ≠ ∅}.
The Vietoris space V(S) of S is defined as a topological space whose underlying set is CS and whose topology is generated by
{BS(U) ; U ∈ OS} ∪ {DS(U) ; U ∈ OS}.
Then we have the following proposition (see [34]).
Proposition 4.3. If S is a Boolean space, then V(S) is a Boolean space whose topology is generated by the following set of clopen
subsets of V(S):
{BS(U) ; U ∈ OS ∩ CS} ∪ {DS(U) ; U ∈ OS ∩ CS}.
We now introduce the concept of L-Vietoris functor.
Definition 4.4. We define the L-Vietoris functor VL : BSL → BSL as follows. For an object (S, α) in BSL, define
VL(S, α) = (V(S),V ◦ α),
where, forM ∈ SubAlg(L), V ◦ α(M) (= V(α(M))) is the Vietoris space of a subspace α(M) of S. For an arrow f : (S, α)→
(S ′, α′) in BSL, VL(f ) : (V(S),V ◦ α)→ (V(S ′),V ◦ α′) is defined by
VL(f )(F) = f (F) (= {f (x) ; x ∈ F})
for F ∈ V(S).
The well-definedness of the L-Vietoris functor is shown by the following two lemmas. We use the notations of
Definition 4.2 in the following proofs of them.
Lemma 4.5. Let (S, α) be an object in BSL. Then, VL(S, α) is an object in BSL.
Proof. By Proposition 4.3, V(S) is a Boolean space.
We show that for M ∈ SubAlg(L), V ◦ α(M) is a closed subspace of V(S). Since an element of V ◦ α(M) is of the form
F ∩ α(M) for F ∈ CS and since by α(M) ∈ CS we have F ∩ α(M) ∈ CS for F ∈ CS , V ◦ α(M) is a subset of V(S). Since for
U ∈ OS we have both
BS(U) ∩ V ◦ α(M) = {F ∈ V ◦ α(M) ; F ⊂ U} = Bα(M)(U ∩ α(M))
and
DS(U) ∩ V ◦ α(M) = {F ∈ V ◦ α(M) ; F ∩ U ≠ ∅} = Dα(M)(U ∩ α(M)),
V ◦ α(M) is a subspace of V(S). In order to show that V ◦ α(M) is closed in V(S), assume that F ∈ V(S) and F /∈ V ◦ α(M).
Then, there is x ∈ F such that x /∈ α(M). Since α(M) is closed in S, DS(S \ α(M)) is open in V(S). Moreover, we have
F ∈ DS(S \ α(M)) and V ◦ α(M) ∩ DS(S \ α(M)) = ∅.
Hence, V ◦ α(M) is closed in V(S).
We next show that V ◦ α satisfies the three conditions in Definition 3.6. It follows from α(L) = S that V ◦ α(L) = V(S).
If L1 ⊂ L2 for L1, L2 ∈ SubAlg(L), then α(L1) ⊂ α(L2) and, since α(L1) is closed in α(L2), we have V ◦ α(L1) ⊂ V ◦ α(L2).
Assume that L1 = L2 ∩ L3 for L1, L2, L3 ∈ SubAlg(L). Then, we have
V ◦ α(L1) = V ◦ α(L2 ∩ L3) = V(α(L2) ∩ α(L3)).
An element of V(α(L2) ∩ α(L3)) is of the form
F ∩ α(L2) ∩ α(L3)
for F ∈ CS . An element of V(α(L2)) ∩ V(α(L3)) is of the form
(F1 ∩ α(L2)) ∩ (F2 ∩ α(L3))
for F1, F2 ∈ CS , which follows from the fact that for X ⊂ S we have
∃F1, F2 ∈ CS X = F1 ∩ α(L2) = F2 ∩ α(L3) ⇔ ∃F1, F2 ∈ CS X = (F1 ∩ α(L2)) ∩ (F2 ∩ α(L3)).
Hence we have V(α(L2) ∩ α(L3)) = V(α(L2)) ∩ V(α(L3)) and so V ◦ α(L1) = V ◦ α(L2) ∩ V ◦ α(L3). 
Lemma 4.6. Let f : (S, α)→ (S ′, α′) be an arrow in BSL. Then, VL(f ) is an arrow in BSL.
576 Y. Maruyama / Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra 216 (2012) 565–580
Proof. Since f is a continuous map between Boolean spaces, it follows from [13, Theorem 3.1.8] that VL(f ) maps a closed
subset of S to a closed subset of S ′. In order to show that VL(f ) is continuous, let U ∈ OS′ . Then we have
VL(f )−1(BS′(U)) = {F ∈ CS ; f (F) ⊂ U} = {F ∈ CS ; F ⊂ f −1(U)} = BS(f −1(U))
and also
VL(f )−1(DS′(U)) = {F ∈ CS ; f (F) ∩ U ≠ ∅} = {F ∈ CS ; F ∩ f −1(U) ≠ ∅} = BS(f −1(U)).
Thus, VL(f ) is continuous. It remains to show that VL(f ) is subspace-preserving. Assume that F ∈ V◦α(M) forM ∈ SubAlg(L).
Then we have F ⊂ α(M). Since f is subspace-preserving, we have f (F) ⊂ α′(M). Thus it follows that
VL(f )(F) = f (F) ⊂ α′(M).
Hence we have VL(f )(F) ∈ V ◦ α′(M). 
In order to show that Coalg(VL) is isomorphic to RBSL, we introduce two functors RC and CR between the two categories.
Definition 4.7. A functor RC : RBSL → Coalg(VL) is defined as follows. For an object (S, α, R) in RBSL, RC(S, α, R) is defined
as a VL-coalgebra
((S, α), R[-])
where R[-] : (S, α)→ VL(S, α) is defined by R[x] = {y ∈ S ; xRy} for x ∈ S. For an arrow f in RBSL, define RC(f ) = f .
In the above definition, RC(S, α, R) is a VL-coalgebra, since R[-] : (S, α)→ VL(S, α) is an arrow in BSL by items 1, 2 and
3 in Definition 3.15 and by Proposition 4.3. It is straightforward to verify that RC(f ) is an arrow in Coalg(VL) for an arrow f
in RBSL. Thus, the functor RC is well defined.
Definition 4.8. A functor CR : Coalg(VL)→ RBSL is defined as follows. For an object ((S, α), δ) in Coalg(VL), define
CR((S, α), δ) = (S, α, Rδ)
where a binary relation Rδ on S is defined by
xRδy⇔ y ∈ δ(x)
for x, y ∈ S. For an arrow f in Coalg(VL), define CR(f ) = f .
The well-definedness of the functor CR is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. For an object ((S, α), δ) in Coalg(VL), CR((S, α), δ) is an object in RBSL.
Proof. It suffices to show that (S, α, Rδ) satisfies the three conditions in Definition 3.15. First, for x ∈ S we have Rδ[x] =
δ(x) ∈ V(S) and so Rδ[x] is a closed subset of V(S). Second, for a clopen subset O of S, the following holds:
R−1δ [O] = {x ∈ S ; ∃y ∈ O xRδy} = {x ∈ S ; ∃y ∈ O y ∈ δ(x)}
= {x ∈ S ; O ∩ δ(x) ≠ ∅} = {x ∈ S ; δ(x) ∈ DS(O)}
= δ−1(DS(O)).
Since O is clopen in S, DS(O) is clopen in V(S) by Proposition 4.3. Thus, since δ is continuous, R−1δ [O] is clopen. Since S is a
Boolean space, this implies that Rδ is a continuous map from S to V(S). Third, if x ∈ α(M) forM ∈ SubAlg(L), then we have
Rδ[x] = δ(x) ∈ V ◦ α(M) (recall that δ is subspace-preserving by definition). This completes the proof. 
It is straightforward to verify that CR(f ) is an arrow in RBSL for an arrow f in Coalg(VL).
Thus we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. The categories Coalg(VL) and RBSL are isomorphic via CR and RC.
Proof. Clearly we have CR ◦ RC(f ) = f for an arrow f in RBSL and RC ◦ CR(f ) = f for an arrow f in Coalg(VL). Let (S, α, R)
be an object in RBSL. Then we have:
xRR[-]y ⇔ y ∈ R[x] ⇔ xRy.
Thus, (S, α, R) is exactly the same as CR ◦ RC(S, α, R). Let ((S, α), δ) be an object in Coalg(VL). Then we have:
y ∈ δRδ (x) ⇔ xRδy ⇔ y ∈ δ(x).
Thus, ((S, α), δ) is exactly the same as RC ◦ CR((S, α), δ). 
By Theorems 3.24 and 4.10, we obtain the following coalgebraic duality theorem, which generalizes the Abramsky–
Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality for modal algebras from the viewpoint of universal algebra.
Theorem 4.11. The categories ISPM(L) and Coalg(VL) are dually equivalent.
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Thus, the modal semi-primal duality ISPM(L) ≃ RBSLop can be described in terms of the theory of coalgebras. The
Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality can be recovered by letting L be the two-element Boolean algebra in the above
theorem.
Since ISPM(n) coincides with the class of all MMVn-algebras and since n forms a semi-primal algebra with a lattice
reduct, the above theorem gives us a coalgebraic duality forMMVn-algebras (i.e., algebras of Łukasiewicz n-valued modal
logic):
Corollary 4.12. The category ofMMVn-algebras and their homomorphisms is dually equivalent to Coalg(Vn).
In a similar way, we obtain a coalgebraic duality for L-ML-algebras (i.e., algebras of a version of Fitting’s many-valuedmodal
logic). We remark that [30, Lemma 2.6] is useful when proving that n is semi-primal (this can be shown in a similar way to
[32, Lemma 2.3] via [30, Lemma 2.6]).
With the help of Corollary 2.5 and Theorem 4.11, we obtain the following.
Corollary 4.13. Coalg(VL) has cofree coalgebras.
Since ISPM(L) has the initial algebra, we obtain the final coalgebra theorem for VL.
Corollary 4.14. The endofunctor VL has a final coalgebra.
If L is not only semi-primal but also primal (for its definition, see [10]), then by Hu theorem (see [10, Theorem 4.1.1])
ISP(L) is dually equivalent to the category of Boolean spaces (i.e., BS2), whence ISPM(L) is dually equivalent to the category
of descriptive general frames (i.e., RBS2) and is also dually equivalent to the category of Stone coalgebras (i.e., Coalg(V2)).
This implies that if L and L′ are primal then the categories ISPM(L) and ISPM(L′) are equivalent. More generally, since the
definition of RBSL depends only on the order structure of subalgebras of L, Theorem 3.24 gives us the following.
Corollary 4.15. If L and L′ are semi-primal algebras with lattice reducts and if SubAlg(L) and SubAlg(L′) are order isomorphic,
then the categories ISPM(L) and ISPM(L′) are equivalent.
Similarly, if L and L′ are semi-primal and if SubAlg(L) and SubAlg(L′) are order isomorphic, then the categories Coalg(VL)
and Coalg(VL′) are equivalent. Note that if L and L′ are primal, then SubAlg(L) and SubAlg(L′) are always order isomorphic.
5. Conclusions and future work
Wehave introduced the newnotion of ISPM and extended the theory of natural dualities so as to encompass the Jónsson–
Tarski duality and the Abramsky–Kupke–Kurz–Venema duality for the class of all modal algebras, which are becomingmore
and more important in coalgebraic logic. Whereas ISP(M) cannot be the class of all modal algebras, crucially, ISPM(2)
coincides with the class of all modal algebras, and furthermore, there are similar facts for algebras of many-valued modal
logics. ISPM thus provides a natural framework for the universal algebra of modalities, and as such, for the theory of modal
natural dualities. From a technical point of view, our starting point was the Keimel–Werner semi-primal duality for ISP(L)
in natural duality theory. Having shifted our focus from ISP(L) to ISPM(L), we verified the Kripke condition for ISPM(L)
where L is a semi-primal algebra with a bounded lattice reduct. The Kripke condition is completeness in logical terms, and
we needed a weaker form of the axiom of choice for the verification of it. As main results, we obtained topological and
coalgebraic dualities for ISPM(L) with three kinds of applications of them: coalgebraic dualities for many-valued modal
logics; the existence of a final coalgebra and cofree coalgebras in Coalg(VL); and a criterion for the equivalence of categories
of the form ISPM(L).
We conclude the paper by mentioning several future directions of research and by placing the Stone duality in a wider
context of the interaction between mathematics and philosophy.
Firstly, it would be fruitful to generalize the notion of ISPM from the viewpoint of coalgebraic logic, since a number of
modal logics (e.g., monotone modal logic and graded modal logic) can be described in coalgebraic terms. This is expected to
allow us to develop natural duality theory for coalgebraic modal logics. Now, how can we generalize ISPM to a coalgebraic-
logical setting? Let us begin with an endofunctor T : Set → Set and fix a function ♥ : T (Ln) → L where n ∈ ω and L is an
algebra (possibly with some conditions on T ,♥, L). Then, given a T-coalgebra δ : X → T (X), we can define an n-ary modal
operation on HomSet(X, L) by
f ∈ HomSet(X, L)n → ♥ ◦ T (f ) ◦ δ ∈ HomSet(X, L)
where f is considered as an element of HomSet(X, Ln) via the isomorphism HomSet(X, L)n ≃ HomSet(X, Ln). We can recover
R : HomSet(X, L) → HomSet(X, L) in Definition 2.1 by letting T : Set → Set be the power-set functor and ♥ : T (L) → L
the meet operation of L. Thus, this yields an extended notion of modal power parametrized by T and ♥, and hence a
generalization of ISPM(L) from the viewpoint of coalgebraic logic. In future work, wewill attempt to develop natural duality
theory for this coalgebraic generalization of ISPM(L).
Another important direction of research would be to establish an intuitionistic analogue of the theory presented in this
paper, which involves a universal-algebraic generalization of Esakia duality for Heyting algebras. First of all, the class of all
Heyting algebras cannot be expressed as ISP(L) for any single algebra L. As already mentioned in Section 1, this is nothing
but a duality-theoretic expression of the reason why Gödel failed to capture intuitionistic logic as a many-valued logic.
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Hence we have to consider a new way to generate a class of algebras. Given an intuitionistic frame (X,≤), we can define an
implication operation→: HomSet(X, L)2 → HomSet(X, L) by
(f → g)(x) =

{f (y)→ g(y) ; x ≤ y}.
In this way, we obtain the concept of an intuitionistic power of L and so the concept of ISPI(L) i.e., the class of isomorphic
copies of subalgebras of intuitionistic powers of L. We can show that, for the two-element distributive lattice 2, ISPI(2)
coincideswith the class of all Heyting algebras and that, fornwithout→ or¬, ISPI(n) coincideswith the class of all algebras
of intuitionistic Łukasiewicz n-valued logic (which is naturally defined via n-valued Kripke semantics). In future work, we
will attempt to develop natural duality theory for ISPI(L), in order to make it possible to incorporate Esakia duality for
Heyting algebras into the theory of natural dualities. At the same time, however, we have to remark that there is a different
perspective on intuitionistic logic, i.e., we can see it as distributive lattices with residuation or the right adjoints of meets.
This point of view leads us to the notion of ISRP, and ISRP(2) coincides with the class of all Heyting algebras. Although
we do not describe a precise definition here, SR(M) is the class of ‘‘residuated’’ subalgebras of a given ordered algebra M .
Interestingly, it does not hold in general that ISPI(M) = ISRP(M). Hence, the two perspectives on intuitionistic logic (i.e.,
the former, Kripke-semantics-based one and the latter, residuation-based one) are really different in that sense.
While natural duality theory is based on universal algebra and general topology (possibly with relational structures),
which are of set-theoretical character, we can also develop duality theory building upon category theory, especially
categorical algebra and categorical topology (see [4]). Because universal algebra is well developed for finitary algebras
(though not for infinitary ones), we consider that natural duality theory is suitable for ‘‘finitary Stone-type dualities’’, by
which we mean the Stone-type dualities concerning finitary operations and so compact spectra. On the other hand, the
theory of monads, which is categorical universal algebra, naturally encompass infinitary algebras such as frames (or locales)
and continuous lattices (both are the Eilenberg–Moore algebras of certainmonads). Accordingly, categorical duality theories
(see, e.g., [33,39]) seem suitable for ‘‘infinitary Stone-type dualities’’, a typical example of which is Isbell–Papert’s dual
adjunction between frames and topological spaces. Note that finitary Stone-type dualities often require aweaker form of the
axiom of choice, whereas infinitary ones sometimes avoid such a non-deterministic principle, as is the case in Isbell–Papert
duality or duality between point-free spaces and point-set spaces in general (see [31,33]).
Categorical duality theories (including those cited above) are usually more general than natural duality theory,
subsuming both finitary and infinitary ones. At the same time, however, they are less substantial than natural duality theory,
especially in the sense that they often lack the ‘‘adequate’’ treatment of dual equivalences. Category theory can lead us to dual
adjunctions in a significant way, but not to dual equivalences. Although there is a mechanical way to derive equivalences
from adjunctions, it is quite trivial, and, at the moment, there appears to be no general, substantial way to do it categorically
as [39, p.102] says (roughly, categories Ai and Bi below amount to trivial descriptions of a dual equivalence derived from a
given dual adjunction):
The main task for establishing a duality in a concrete situation is now to identify Ai and Bi. This can be a very hard
problem, and this is where categorical guidance comes to an end.
The real issue thus lies in providing substantial characterizations of Ai and Bi. In contrast to this situation in categorical
duality theories, natural duality theory does yield non-trivial descriptions of Ai and Bi involved, thus revealing how dual
equivalences can be developed in various concrete situations. We consider that this is an important strength of natural
duality theory, gained by restricting its scope more than categorical duality theories. By focusing on less general situations,
natural duality theory succeeds in giving a more nuanced understanding of the Stone duality.
Finally, we briefly touch upon the fundamental question: why do we study the Stone duality (in a wider sense) at all?
The Stone-type dualities are theoretically elegant, and there would be no doubt that they are highly beneficial in practice,
since they have indeed had numerous applications in logic, mathematics, and computer science. This is not what we really
want to say here, however. Facing the question, we dare to say that the Stone duality is duality between human knowledge
and the reality of the world, or duality between epistemology and ontology, the two fundamental disciplines of philosophy.
This nature of the Stone duality is particularly striking in the case of duality between point-set spaces and point-free spaces,
as points are ontological ingredients of the notion of space, and regions (or properties of space) are its epistemological
ingredients (for more details, see [33]).
The idea of the Stone duality as duality between ontology and epistemology is not merely a philosophical doctrine, but
also a crucial notion lurking behind practical applications of the Stone duality. For example, the main idea of [1] was to
see the Stone duality as duality between observable properties and denotational meanings of computational processes.
Obviously, observable properties of computational processes are human knowledge in the context of computer science, and
their denotational meanings are a matter of reality and not that of human knowledge (of course, computational processes
are the ‘‘world’’ in computer science; we do not necessarily mean this real world by ‘‘world’’).
Duality between algebras and coalgebras, including those relevant to this paper, may also be considered as an expression
of duality between the epistemological and the ontological, via the idea of coalgebraic logic that coalgebras represent some
sort of systems (e.g., computer systems) and algebras the (observable) properties of them. Here recall that usually we can
only know about computer systems through their (observable) properties; evidently, the former is on the side of reality, and
the latter on the side of our knowledge. Broadly speaking, most Stone-type dualities in mathematical logic are expressions
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of duality between syntax and semantics, which is in turn a specific kind of duality between the epistemological and the
ontological.
Such a dichotomy (or duality) between epistemological and ontological things or perspectives can actually be observed
in a much broader context, and so is the relation of the epistemological with the ontological. We mention only one case
here. Kitaro Nishida, a philosopher of the Kyoto School, considered experience as having a person, rather than a person as
having experience, saying (see [36,21]):
Over time I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that an individual
exists because there is experience.
That is, a person is (or at least may be identified with) a bundle of experiences, which is conceived of as being more primary
than the notion of a person, in the Nishida philosophy. Its family resemblance to point-free geometry could be clarified in
analogy with the leading idea of point-free geometry that a point is a bundle of shrinking regions (or certain properties of
space).
Philosophical dichotomies can evolve intomathematical (categorical) dualities, as the case of point-free geometry shows.
Indeed, foundational ideas of point-free geometry were first proposed by philosophers including Whitehead and Husserl,
and then they were implemented in mathematical fashions, giving rise to categorical dualities between point-free spaces
and point-set spaces as mentioned above. It would thus be fruitful to pursuit categorical dualities corresponding to given
philosophical dichotomies, which may even have practical impacts as the Stone duality was applied to computer science.
With such evidence in mind, we believe that the Stone duality can form a significant theme of philosophy as well as
mathematics. From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, it would also be worth noting that the 20th century was the
time when the emphasis drastically shifted from the ontological to the epistemological in diverse disciplines, ranging from
mathematics (e.g., non-commutative geometry), to physics (e.g., algebraic quantum field theory), to computer science (e.g.,
domain theory in logical form; logic in general is of such nature), and to philosophy (e.g., the theory of meaning; we wonder
if we could add phenomenology here).
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